Situation Afghanistan

THIS IS A REPORT MADE BY THE SOUTH ASIAN ANALYSIS GROUP

The US has maintained its relentless Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on the suspected hide-outs and vehicular movements of the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan—TTP) in the North and South Waziristan areas of Pakistan. According to an estimate of the British Broadcasting Corporation mentioned in a report on its web site on June 11, 2010, there have been about 70 Drone strikes since the beginning of this year resulting in more than 200 fatalities. The BBC estimate does not mention how many of these fatalities were of the leaders and other cadres of the two Talibans and how many were of civilians.

Reports from reliable sources in the area indicate that while there have been civilian fatalities they are not as large as made out to be by anti-US elements in the Af-Pak area. Many of the civilians killed would not come under the category of “innocents” in the sense that they had nothing to do with the Talibans. While many of them might not have been activists of the Talibans, they were providing them logistic help at the time they got killed. If one excludes their number, the number of innocent civilians killed due to poor intelligence or wrong targeting is quite small, the sources say.



US claims of having killed a number of senior and middle-level leaders of the Talibans and Al Qaeda are not exaggerated. Some of its claims have been subsequently corroborated by independent sources and even admitted by these organizations themselves. While the US has thus reason to be gratified by the success rate of its Drone strikes, it should be seriously worried by the failure of these strikes to have an impact on the ground situation, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

4. The loss of many leaders of the older vintage has not demoralized the Talibans. They have been able to find new leaders as motivated and as capable as the old. There has been no dent on the flow of new volunteers to join the ranks of the Talibans and there has been no weakening of capability and of the ability to take the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani security forces even in the non-tribal areas by surprise.

This became evident earlier this week when the Afghan Taliban managed to kill seven Americans, two Australians and one French soldier on June 7 followed by the deaths of three more NATO troops the next day. The deaths of 10 NATO soldiers made June 7 the deadliest day for foreign troops in Afghanistan since 14 Americans, including 11 US soldiers, died in two helicopter crashes on October 26, 2009. This has been further followed by the deaths of four more NATO troops on June 9 when their helicopter was brought down by suspected Taliban fire.



The same day ( June 9 ), upto 12 gunmen suspected to be from the Pakistani Taliban attacked a convoy of private trucks carrying logistic supplies for the NATO troops in Afghanistan from the Karachi port. The attack took place at Tarnol, 10 kms from Islamabad on the road to Peshawar. Seven persons believed to be drivers and cleaners of the private trucks in the convoy were killed and 70 lorries transporting fuel and other non-classified material were destroyed. The terrorists launched the attack when the trucks carrying the supplies had stopped for rest and refueling.

In January, the Pakistani Taliban had twice attacked trucks carrying supplies for the NATO near Karachi and now they have attacked a convoy at a place close to Islamabad without being prevented by the Pakistani security forces. Their ability to organize successful strikes----- though still sporadic---- in the non-tribal areas shows that the claimed successes of the Pakistan Army in re-establishing control over areas under the sway of the TTP in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan have not dented the capability of the TTP to divert its operations to the non-tribal areas. While the Afghan Taliban continues to seek territorial dominance, the Pakistani Taliban no longer does so. Instead, it has sought to maintain its tactical mobility and flexibility and ability to provide back-up support to the operations of the Afghan Taliban. The two Talibans are working in tandem effectively.

According to a spokesperson of the US Transportation Command in Washington DC, about 60 per cent of the supplies----food, fuel and some equipment--- is still moved from Karachi by road, 30 per cent by train across Russia and the Central Asian Republics and the remaining 20 per cent consisting of ammunition and other classified items is flown by air directly to Afghanistan. The spokesperson claimed that attacks such as the one near Islamabad----though serious---- have not had any significant impact on the NATO’s ability to replenish itself.



The revamped US strategy in the Ad-Pak area consisting essentially of attempts at ground dominance in the Afghan territory and stepped-up Drone strikes in the Pakistani territory is nowhere near bringing about a turning point in the US battle against the Afghan Taliban. The efforts of President Hamid Karzai to identify and wean away the inadequately motivated elements in the Afghan Taliban through offers of money, perks and a share of power under his continuing leadership are not making headway despite reported secret contacts with claimed Taliban elements in places such as the Maldives and the recent jirga, which was a spectacular event, but nothing more. There have been no substantive political results and there are unlikely to be any.

The ideological solidarity in the two Talibans remains strong. Their bases of support in the Pashtun communities on both sides are intact. Mr.Karzai has no significant support from the Pakistani Pashtun community except from the followers of the Awami National Party now in power in the province of Khyber Pakhtoonkwa ( the old North-West Frontier Province). His support in the Afghan Pashtun community is more, but not sufficient to slow down the flow of volunteers to the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, has been able to draw volunteers from the Pashtun communities in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The recent successes of the two Talibans show that their ability to plan and carry out operations at a time and place of their choice remains strong.

The US is far from prevailing over the Afghan Taliban and being able to bring about a turning point on the ground which would facilitate a down-sizing of the US presence in time for it to make a favourable impact on Mr.Barack Obama’s bid for re-election in 2012. It looks as if the final outcome in the Af-Pak area will be determined by who has the better battle stamina and staying power. The stamina and staying power of the US-led NATO forces do not seem to be strong enough to bring about a turning point favourable to them. The success of the Indian policy in Afghanistan would depend on the final success of the US-led NATO forces and the Afghan National Army on the ground. That success is not yet in sight. Is it time to have a second look at India’s policy? What should be India’s objective in the present circumstances? Continuing to expand India’s role in the hope that the NATO and the ANA would finally prevail? Consolidating its present role without further expanding it till the ground situation starts improving----if at all it does? Is there scope for a compatibility between the interests and roles of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan? Should India diversify its contacts in the Pashtun communities of Afghanistan and Pakistan? What role can the generally India-friendly ANP play in this regard? These are questions which need serious examination by our policy-makers.

India’s Afghan policy has passed through three phases. Between 1947 and September 1996, when the Taliban captured power in Kabul, it was Pashtun-centric. Between September 1996 and the defeat of the Taliban by the US in 2001-end, it became Tajik-centric with India, Russia and Iran jointly supporting the Northern Alliance. Since the assumption of power by Mr.Karzai in Kabul, India has been re-cultivating the Pashtuns of Afghanistan while seeking to keep intact the goodwill earned by it among the non-Pashtuns. The six years of rule by the National Democratic Alliance Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee saw an erosion of the goodwill of the Pakistani Pashtun community loyal to the ANP towards India. The present Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh has not attempted to re-establish our traditional contacts with sections of the Pakistani Pashtun community. Our traditional friends in the Pashtun community have not played an adequate role in the evolution of our Afghan policy. Our policy is influenced more by strategic calculations than by historic affinities. It is time for a course correction

Starategic scenario in South Asia.

"Strategic scenario", huh? Its a big cool word which might give people a sense that this post is not for commoners. It is an irony though, that the problem this post conveys can be solved only if the common people understands it. So let me start with a story I once heard.

Back when the British were still masters of our country, in the town of Jamshedpur there lived two Indian boys, Ram and Nitish. They went to a missionary school were a british boy, Eric also came. Eric was richer and often used his money and the inborn superiority complex to gain his friends. Nitish being quick witted joined Eric's gang and often joined the English boy in ragging others including Ram. Independence changed that. In a stroke, all of Erics power was stripped and he faced the reality of leaving India. Nitish, forever quick, struck up a friendship with Ram. In one quick and sudden moment of history, the rolesof the people in the game changed.

Something very similar is happening all around us in te neighbourhood we call South Asia.

There are two very powerful forces in world diplomacy and relations. The power of brute military and economic force, also called hard power and the power of integrity, honesty, righteousness and values, also called soft power. The very nature of India's independece(non violent) ensured that we inherited considerable amount of soft power. We used this, judiciously dring the cold war. Since the end of the 90s, we have used soft power to achieve several quick and decisive foreign affairs objectives.

1. Substantial progress with Pakistan under Musharaff


2. Indo-US nuclear deal


3. NSG waiver


4. To be seen as a possible counter to China


5. Warming relationship with East Asia


6. Closer ties with EU in military sphere


7. Retention of close Russian ties despite flourishing contact with USA.

These objectives set us up as a crucial great power and a future world power, especially when the USA considered us to be an effective counter to China. The support we got from the one super power was tremendous. Things now are different

Today, April the 23rd, 2010. Five days before the 2010 SAARC summit in Bhutan things are much more grim for India. Pakistan is belligerent over every issue even terrorism, China is testing the Indosphere, creating naval bases in southasian countries of Myanmar, Sri lanka, bangladesh, Pakistan and maldives.

How did we reach this mess. It started on a night nearly a year ago, in a country far far away, with the words, "America is a place where all things are possible". Barrack Obama, 44th president of the United States, will prove just that. What we Indians thought impossible is now quickly becoming our fate. Obama was faced with two quick and obvious long term popular decisions.

1. Withdrawal of troops from Iraq


2. Withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan

As a clever man he realized that the latter would be much more difficult than the former. Iraq is relatively straightforward, compared to the cauldron of Afghanistan. To ensure future stability of that country would require not just the support of a faction of the taliban, but more that of its immediate neighbour, Pakistan. As prudence has always guided american policy Obama gave Pakistan an important bargain chip. One that could be effectively used to pressure India to remain amicable to Pakistan after 28/11.

Pursuing his direct policy to China Obama has attempted to neutralize the Chinese threat and turn it into a meaningful co-operation by directly engaging with Beijing, sidelining India. China and Pakistan have excellent foreign relations and they know when 1+1=2. India is being hit on two fronts by the USA.

What can India do? History has shown us that at defferent times we find different ways to succeed. Soft power took us through for a decade, but pure reliance on soft power use with Pakistan is getting us nowhere. It is neccesary that India demonstrate a trace of its hard power, in making firm demands and other affirmative actions to ensurethe establishment of its superiority in South Asia. Otherwise, the once China containment which has already meted away will slowly but surely become the Indian containment. A show of will by the Indian people, government and military can do wonders. It is sullying to hear the foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr Qureshi say India is coming back to talks on its knees.

What about America? The decisions taken by Mr Obama have logic, but are nevertheless wrong. Afghanistan has never been a dear friend of Pakistan, but one of India's. By restricting Indian influence at the behest of Pakistani request, he is handing over control of one failed state to another failing one. Pakistan neither has the will or acumen to achieve the Obama objective. The identity of the Pakistani nation is itself built around anti Indian beliefs. As for China, well the chinese are powerful. Mr Obama is still making one fundamental mistake in foreign affairs. Never trust a friend who is not of your flock. Especially when he is as big as you. Obama is turning sour the opinion of america in the only true democracy of south asia. As he does so he may find out that he has achieved a narrow sighted domestic target at the loss of complete american strategic gains in Asia, and by 2030, the Eastern hemisphere.

India and Pakistan

Once more many of us must read yet another article about an issue we sometimes wish, would just cease to exist. Yet you wont find a street corner where this topic isnt being discussed in some form of the other. Just another way the human mind works. Indo-Pak relations are probably one of the most dynamic in the world and I pity the foreign relations student who chooses this as a case study. After over sixty years of independence and having fought four major wars our nations have progressed little. Blame this attentuation of diplomatic resolve on whomever you want, but that will not bring us any closer to a solution. The latest hurdles include videotapes of Hafeez Mohammed Saeed's "Jihad on India" speech. I have found it amazing that despite the obvious proof of terror emanating from across the Indian border, how is it that there have been so few extraditions between our nations. Why is it that despite the speeches Mr. Saeed makes, he is a free man?

The answer to these questions require one to be aware of Pakistan's origin and present status. Pakistan was primarily created in an era of nationalism. The nation, being surrounded by a bigger and obviously hurt neighbour(India) relied on the Two Nation theory to retain its independence and distinct cultural heritage. On 1971 everything changed; with the creation of an independent Bangladesh, India could claim the two nation theory to be void. Meanwhile the cultural amalgamation of islam with hinduism which was exceptionally visible in Lucknow and Hyderabad, proved that Indian diversity could stand the test of time. Presidents of India have been muslims. All these began to prove Mr. Jinnah's fears to be unfound. There were problems but problems existed in Pakistan as well. Out of fear of loosing its identity Pakistan united in the oly way it could; against India. India became a common foe and a rallying cry for unity. That is why even today Pakistan finds it difficult to concede even on moral terms with India. Every dealing with Hindustan must be a victorious outcome for the eyes of the public.

Come modernity, and these issues are changing. The youth find more similarity amongst themselves than differences. Yet, several thousands are still drawn into the extremist teachings of some. India and Pakistan can attempt to ride the issue out, to wait for the demise of the ideology. That though would tire that patience of many. To act now would require India to play a cautious part. American power was often characterized by the victories in Iraq or Germany but often enough true power is displayed by those who are poised and composed. That is the inherent Indian nature of dealing with problems. That is why, Mr. Saeed, India cannot be defeated like NATO or America. We do not play by their rules so you do not know how to play us. Hell! sometimes even I cant forsee what we will do. We however will not give in to emotions alone; as an ancient civilization we have learned much from history and time. We will take it one day at a time and strike when and where neccesary.
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