Getting around on a flat world

This blog is based on the book, The World is Flat, written by Thomas L. Friedman. I’m going to write on his ideas and what it means for people like me; young college going students of India.
The first question I had when I came across this topic was pretty obvious. What does someone mean by, “The World is flat”. I still remember my first grade teacher showing us a globe. She wouldn’t have been bluffing, would she? So that’s how Mr. Friedman hooked me to read the book. I read it because the title made me curious.

The world is flat, as Friedman explains, because “Globalization today empowers, enables and enjoins individuals and small groups to go global so easily and seamlessly”. Thing about it! How many things can you do today, which only major corporations could do a decade or so ago? Building a website, sharing information through voice and text with millions, interacting and communicating across the world are some. You can do all this today because they are essentially free, thanks to the internet. The playing field has been leveled and the global world; flattened.

One of the few new effects of this is outsourcing. India has benefited tremendously from this courtesy the new jobs flowing in. It doesn’t end here. Remember I said in the previous paragraph how individuals are being empowered. This has led to dynamic new ideas and innovations being born and put into business. On both worlds, both new and old (America and Eurasia) individuals are cutting into the growing pie of the global economy.

Friedman’s book fails to mention a recession because it occurred much later. No matter. The recession is a bump, a speed breaker to check the progress we are so rapidly making. The zenith of IT for example was after the DOT COM bubble (more info) burst.

The point that is coming to a clear focus is this. In the new age, there will be two ways to succeed. A mass of people mostly in the developing nations will start doing the work the developed nations had assigned to their workforce. These people will start working for a better standard of life. The other way will be occupied by those in the developed economies,(or even quick growers in the developing sphere) who learn to be more than a professional. They would require being great adapters, explainers, collaborators, leveragers, passionate and good networkers. They will need to create new ideas and make them marketable or offer something that makes them indispensable to a global supply chain. They have the power to do this, thanks to the internet.

Right now no one is completely certain where the developed world is heading next. We are at the brink of a revolution in industry and business, akin to the industrial revolution. Remember all those workers who were left jobless when the machines came to work? That’s kind of where we are right now. The workers starved initially and then as they accepted the machines, they changed their skill set to become operators. In the economic boom that followed, new companies bought more machines, needed more workers and prosperity ensued.

This is what we should be heading for. A world where an individual will have the power to affect his economic destiny; through collaboration with others like him.

Why study in the United States?

This question has become a cliche and so have the answers. The truth is that many people are irresistibly drawn to the US without grasping how the that helps them to achieve their end. The States is one amongst the many rich and developed English speaking nations. Why is it the preferred hub for students?

Earlier it was common to complete the undergrad in India and get the Masters done from the US. While with time the brain drain has decreased, with increased affluence and wealth a surprising new trend is emerging. In 2009 the rate of growth of international undergraduate students in the US surpassed that of graduate students. This is accentuated by a slow decline of students from India intending to get a masters but not undergrad courses.

Analysis

The prediction is of course closely related to the financial crisis. As the US job market takes a hit, students who intended to go to America to earn big bucks and live a good life move elsewhere. As that happens we find that new answers are being given to the old cliched question, "Why the USA?".

Answers like, "For great research opportunities" or "to become better entrepreneurs" or even "to get a global exposure" are on the rise and this is a good sign; both for the USA and India. Different students have different aims and outlooks. One is to earn good money and get stability. Others might prefer to lead an easy and fun life within means. Finally there are those who are inclined towards creativity and entrepreneurship . We are seeing a resurgence of the second and third category of students.

I think I belong to the third class and I will support their cause in my blog. A country as large and economically connected as the United States of America cannot go under. In fact this void of economic stability provides a chance for new opportunities. Research done now can create products which will gain enormous market value as the economy recharges itself. The third breed of students are essentially pioneers. Rather than simply follow an established system, they should try to better it.

There are few places in the world where technical education is so closely tied with industry demands. The United States' hands on or practically oriented education is compatible to the needs of the incoming students. This ensures that ideas are created and find a hope of sustenance as long as they provide a use. The success of an idea is the success of the student. Isn't it?

Honey, Dont fly like a maniac!!!

Its the year 2030 and the roads of Delhi are bursting at their seams. I fly to my home in a Ankyo PAV(Personal Air Vehicle) that costs little more than 42000$. I got my first intro to PAV's courtesy the Jetsons on cartoon network. As I googled more into it I realized that the idea had actually been brought very close to reality. In fact one of the colleges I applied to, Illinois Tech, has an active research cell on this topic.

I reason that there are three prime requirements of PAV's.
1.Ease of Use
2.Low cost and maintenance
3.Strong safety record

Safety is a core concern. That however can be taken care of provided the design and working of the vehicle is sound. Besides being really ease to use that is.

The second point also depends largely on the design and working. Right now the option of a VTOL(Vertical take off and Landing) engine is popular. VTOL's take very little area to get into the air. They are also extremely slow at landing/takeoff stage giving users superior control. The only problem is that the cost of these engines are exorbitant. Still with innovations in material sciences and propulsion systems such as carbon fiber and tilt rotor, anything seems possible.

                                                    a harrier lifts of vertically with a column of air

The thing that interests me the most is the ease of use part. This will be the soul of the plane, its software. Planes are managed by electronic systems called avionics which run on a software. These softwares of the future have to take various inputs and effectively fly the plane single handed. This is because the average driver would know very little about complex flying. It will be akin to putting an AI (Artificial Intelligence) into the plane. Unlike the US air drones which still depend on user input, these airplanes will be the ultimate robots in the air.

Situation Afghanistan

THIS IS A REPORT MADE BY THE SOUTH ASIAN ANALYSIS GROUP

The US has maintained its relentless Drone (pilotless plane) strikes on the suspected hide-outs and vehicular movements of the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan—TTP) in the North and South Waziristan areas of Pakistan. According to an estimate of the British Broadcasting Corporation mentioned in a report on its web site on June 11, 2010, there have been about 70 Drone strikes since the beginning of this year resulting in more than 200 fatalities. The BBC estimate does not mention how many of these fatalities were of the leaders and other cadres of the two Talibans and how many were of civilians.

Reports from reliable sources in the area indicate that while there have been civilian fatalities they are not as large as made out to be by anti-US elements in the Af-Pak area. Many of the civilians killed would not come under the category of “innocents” in the sense that they had nothing to do with the Talibans. While many of them might not have been activists of the Talibans, they were providing them logistic help at the time they got killed. If one excludes their number, the number of innocent civilians killed due to poor intelligence or wrong targeting is quite small, the sources say.



US claims of having killed a number of senior and middle-level leaders of the Talibans and Al Qaeda are not exaggerated. Some of its claims have been subsequently corroborated by independent sources and even admitted by these organizations themselves. While the US has thus reason to be gratified by the success rate of its Drone strikes, it should be seriously worried by the failure of these strikes to have an impact on the ground situation, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

4. The loss of many leaders of the older vintage has not demoralized the Talibans. They have been able to find new leaders as motivated and as capable as the old. There has been no dent on the flow of new volunteers to join the ranks of the Talibans and there has been no weakening of capability and of the ability to take the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani security forces even in the non-tribal areas by surprise.

This became evident earlier this week when the Afghan Taliban managed to kill seven Americans, two Australians and one French soldier on June 7 followed by the deaths of three more NATO troops the next day. The deaths of 10 NATO soldiers made June 7 the deadliest day for foreign troops in Afghanistan since 14 Americans, including 11 US soldiers, died in two helicopter crashes on October 26, 2009. This has been further followed by the deaths of four more NATO troops on June 9 when their helicopter was brought down by suspected Taliban fire.



The same day ( June 9 ), upto 12 gunmen suspected to be from the Pakistani Taliban attacked a convoy of private trucks carrying logistic supplies for the NATO troops in Afghanistan from the Karachi port. The attack took place at Tarnol, 10 kms from Islamabad on the road to Peshawar. Seven persons believed to be drivers and cleaners of the private trucks in the convoy were killed and 70 lorries transporting fuel and other non-classified material were destroyed. The terrorists launched the attack when the trucks carrying the supplies had stopped for rest and refueling.

In January, the Pakistani Taliban had twice attacked trucks carrying supplies for the NATO near Karachi and now they have attacked a convoy at a place close to Islamabad without being prevented by the Pakistani security forces. Their ability to organize successful strikes----- though still sporadic---- in the non-tribal areas shows that the claimed successes of the Pakistan Army in re-establishing control over areas under the sway of the TTP in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan have not dented the capability of the TTP to divert its operations to the non-tribal areas. While the Afghan Taliban continues to seek territorial dominance, the Pakistani Taliban no longer does so. Instead, it has sought to maintain its tactical mobility and flexibility and ability to provide back-up support to the operations of the Afghan Taliban. The two Talibans are working in tandem effectively.

According to a spokesperson of the US Transportation Command in Washington DC, about 60 per cent of the supplies----food, fuel and some equipment--- is still moved from Karachi by road, 30 per cent by train across Russia and the Central Asian Republics and the remaining 20 per cent consisting of ammunition and other classified items is flown by air directly to Afghanistan. The spokesperson claimed that attacks such as the one near Islamabad----though serious---- have not had any significant impact on the NATO’s ability to replenish itself.



The revamped US strategy in the Ad-Pak area consisting essentially of attempts at ground dominance in the Afghan territory and stepped-up Drone strikes in the Pakistani territory is nowhere near bringing about a turning point in the US battle against the Afghan Taliban. The efforts of President Hamid Karzai to identify and wean away the inadequately motivated elements in the Afghan Taliban through offers of money, perks and a share of power under his continuing leadership are not making headway despite reported secret contacts with claimed Taliban elements in places such as the Maldives and the recent jirga, which was a spectacular event, but nothing more. There have been no substantive political results and there are unlikely to be any.

The ideological solidarity in the two Talibans remains strong. Their bases of support in the Pashtun communities on both sides are intact. Mr.Karzai has no significant support from the Pakistani Pashtun community except from the followers of the Awami National Party now in power in the province of Khyber Pakhtoonkwa ( the old North-West Frontier Province). His support in the Afghan Pashtun community is more, but not sufficient to slow down the flow of volunteers to the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, has been able to draw volunteers from the Pashtun communities in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The recent successes of the two Talibans show that their ability to plan and carry out operations at a time and place of their choice remains strong.

The US is far from prevailing over the Afghan Taliban and being able to bring about a turning point on the ground which would facilitate a down-sizing of the US presence in time for it to make a favourable impact on Mr.Barack Obama’s bid for re-election in 2012. It looks as if the final outcome in the Af-Pak area will be determined by who has the better battle stamina and staying power. The stamina and staying power of the US-led NATO forces do not seem to be strong enough to bring about a turning point favourable to them. The success of the Indian policy in Afghanistan would depend on the final success of the US-led NATO forces and the Afghan National Army on the ground. That success is not yet in sight. Is it time to have a second look at India’s policy? What should be India’s objective in the present circumstances? Continuing to expand India’s role in the hope that the NATO and the ANA would finally prevail? Consolidating its present role without further expanding it till the ground situation starts improving----if at all it does? Is there scope for a compatibility between the interests and roles of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan? Should India diversify its contacts in the Pashtun communities of Afghanistan and Pakistan? What role can the generally India-friendly ANP play in this regard? These are questions which need serious examination by our policy-makers.

India’s Afghan policy has passed through three phases. Between 1947 and September 1996, when the Taliban captured power in Kabul, it was Pashtun-centric. Between September 1996 and the defeat of the Taliban by the US in 2001-end, it became Tajik-centric with India, Russia and Iran jointly supporting the Northern Alliance. Since the assumption of power by Mr.Karzai in Kabul, India has been re-cultivating the Pashtuns of Afghanistan while seeking to keep intact the goodwill earned by it among the non-Pashtuns. The six years of rule by the National Democratic Alliance Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee saw an erosion of the goodwill of the Pakistani Pashtun community loyal to the ANP towards India. The present Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh has not attempted to re-establish our traditional contacts with sections of the Pakistani Pashtun community. Our traditional friends in the Pashtun community have not played an adequate role in the evolution of our Afghan policy. Our policy is influenced more by strategic calculations than by historic affinities. It is time for a course correction

Crossroad in Afghanistan

Afghanistan.

When I think about it, it amazes me to see how many trees have been cut to print articles about this country. In the last thirty years, many thousands have died fighting against occupiers, for faith and honor. You could say that their last thirty years of history was writ in blood. This has left a deep and lasting psychological impact on the people. Post resuscitation of their country, Afghanis expected the dream of Ahmed Shah Massoud to become a reality. That failed and a strong democratic nation could not be established.



Out of this darkness the Afghani people and especially children have developed apathy to values perceived to be American, namely liberty, democracy and free economy. This will be the source of future problems. The issue in Afghanistan is not intrinsic to the country. Its more like a parasite. The country was a fertile ground for jihadist activities due to the war mongering developed amongst its people. Now as ordinary afghans grow increasingly tired of violence the fight is being led by foreign fighters. They neither care for Afghanistan or its people. The Taliban especially see the warlords as temporary allies on the road back to power. This is probably the greatest strength of the Afghan government.




The threat to the stability of the Afghan democracy stems from two primary sources. One is the resurgent Taliban and the other being the warlords.
Both can be quelled if the Afghan government in Kabul is viewed positively by the people. This would require extremely good governance. The values of democracy, namely freedom and liberty must be enjoyed by most if not all. Economy can be revived by spending on infrastructure and cottage industries. Afghanistan needs to create a middle class. This strategy will be especially suitable against the Taliban which depends largely on supporters from the lower society of the country.
Paradoxically the warlords threaten the integrity of the country through their immense wealth and connections in the high rungs of power. Money gives them the ability to higher men and contacts within the government give them the right to rule their estates. A suitable countermeasure would be to involve different people. What Afghanistan needs desperately now are leaders. Right now political power is concentrated at Kabul. Regional leaders and warlords need to be brought into the parliament by election. This is not unlike the integration of post independence India.




Maybe Afghanistan has more to learn from India than Pakistan. Maybe the United States would be better advised to let the Afghani people chose their ally and make their decisions for the fate of their country.

The state of Indo-US ties, after Bush

THIS IS A REPORT MADE TO THE SOUTH ASIAN ANALYSIS GROUP at


In this review of the US-India Strategic Partnership, two major deductions arise in terms of strategic gains and setbacks to the United States and India in the last 10 years of the evolving US-India Strategic Partnership. These two major deductions are:

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United States has been the major gainer in the US-India Strategic Partnership. In the Asian strategic power balance the United States has managed to “lock-in” India on its side, if not as an ally, but no less as a strategic partner. With India added the Asian power balance is in favor of the United States.
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India has been the major loser, in that no strategic gains have accrued to India. This US-India Strategic Partnership failed to provide India with countervailing power against Pakistan and China, singly and jointly. Pakistan and China have emerged as more adversarial in the wake of this Strategic Partnership. Additionally, the present Government has stood fixated on the United States and on its prodding appeasing Pakistan, despite Mumbai 26/11 and the terrorist trail preceding it. The Prime Minister’s fixation on the United States in last six years robbed India’s foreign policy of its strategic autonomy, flexibility and manoeuvring space in its foreign policy formulations. Earlier Strategic Partnerships were neglected by India during the last six years with no strategic gains to show from the US-India strategic partnership.

Strategic analysis of the last 10 years or so would indicate that if not from the Indian Governments perspective, but from the perspective of strategically-minded Indian there have been more “lows’ than “highs” in the US-India Strategic Partnership.

The US-India Strategic Partnership, had it been substantively evolved could have matured into a “game-changer” in international politics and the global strategic calculus. Mid-way in its evolution the United States let this Strategic Partnership being eclipsed by American strategic priorities centered in Pakistan and China.

In the last year and a half with the advent of the Obama Administration, a “strategic cynicism” had begun to settle down in India in its perspectives on the US-India Strategic Partnership This basically arose from the Obama Administration’s policy formulations on Pakistan and the US inducements to China to contrive a G-2 combine of USA and China for global economic and by extension strategic management.



Obama Administration’s Pakistan and China policy formulations seriously impinged on India’s strategic interests and strategic sensitivities. India stood marginalized in the regional context of South Asia in favour of Pakistan and in the global context by US deference to China.

Against such a contextual background a visibly concerted renewed emphasis on the US-India Strategic Partnership by the United States at multiple high levels does not generate any euphoria but rather a cautious optimism.

India’s foreign policy establishment therefore needs to make a serious assessment as to whether the US renewed emphasis on US-India Strategic Partnership and it being ‘the United States defining partnership of the 21st century” is once again a tactical rhetorical exercise or has it finally dawned on the United States to invest and add more substantial value to this evolving partnership.

On balance, the following contextual developments seem to have prompted the United States renewed emphasis on US-India Strategic Partnership, currently visible.

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Pakistan: The United States Strategic denouement with its strategic utility, creepingly visible
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China: The economic and political denouement of the United States due to lack of China’s substantial responses to Obama Administration’s overtures on economic issues and regional/global issues.
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President Obama’s forthcoming visit to India in November 2010

The United States renewed emphasis on the US-India Strategic Partnership if arising from the American denouement with Pakistan and China, can then only be viewed as a “rebound” towards India. Saying the right things before President Obama’s visit as an ambience-preparation is expected. The challenge now is therefore for the United States to dispel these conclusions by adding strategic substance to back American glowing tributes to India now emanating from Washington.

On the eve of the first ever US-India Strategic Dialogue at ministerial level a number of re-assuring statements and assertions have emanated from Washington on the value that USA attaches to this Strategic Partnership.

While the above is welcomed and hopefully they would stand reinforced and reasserted during President Obama’s visit to India in November 2010, the US record of delivering the “implicit deliverables” on the US-India Strategic Partnership suggests otherwise.

With the above as a backdrop, this Paper attempts to examine some crucial related issues:

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US-India Strategic Partnership: A “Hedging Strategy” of the United States?
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Strategic Limitations of India’s Political Leadership in Management of Strategic Partnerships

US-India Strategic Partnership: A “Hedging Strategy” of the United States?

There is a wide gap between the rhetorical flourishes that attend the US-India Strategic Partnership and the strategic realities that have emerged facing India in the wake of forging this Strategic Partnership in relation to Pakistan and China.

In June 2010, the picture obtaining of Pakistan and China’s strategic stances after nearly ten years of US-India Strategic Partnership is as follows:

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Pakistan’s confrontational stances against India and her strategic and political arrogance stand accentuated by United States lavish endowments on Pakistan’s strategic utility to US interests and followed by inflow of sizeable advanced military hardware, military aid and pandering to Pakistan Army’s strategic sensitivities at India’s strategic expense.
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China sensing the United States de-valuation of the US-India Strategic Partnership stood emboldened in the last two years or so to escalate tension on the China-India border in the form of border intrusions and provocations.

In both cases above, Pakistan and China stood emboldened by the United States strategic ambiguity on the value to the United States of the US-India Strategic Partnership.

Retrospectively, it seems on balance that the United States views the US-India Strategic Partnership as more of a US “hedging strategy” till such time India emerges as a more “pronounced strategically collusive partner of the United States".

The above is never likely to happen and in terms of the US-India Strategic Partnership, both the United States and India may have to apply mid-course corrections.

Contextually, in terms of the regional and global security environment emerging, any US “hedging strategy” vis-à-vis India may lead to India being forced into other strategic orbits.

To this Author and to many in India, it appears that the US-India Strategic Partnership with its current contours and nuances has robbed India of its strategic autonomy, flexibility and space for diplomatic manoeuvre in India’s foreign policy. The Indian Government has become a captive to US strategic priorities in South Asia and follows a reactive foreign policy or no policy at all.

Such impressions are not conducive e to the development of a robust and long-lasting US-India Strategic Partnership. United States efforts in this direction cannot be exclusively focused on the person of Dr. Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister. In India, the Prime Minister is growingly being seen as in a “state of disconnect” with Indian public opinion when it comes to USA and Pakistan. The United States must engage in a political quest for bi-partisan political support for this Strategic Partnership. India expects that both USA and India handle the US-India Strategic Partnership in a transparent manner, and not like the American handing of Pakistani dictators and Army Chiefs.

Strategic Limitations of India’s Political Leadership in Management of Strategic Partnerships

Strategic partnerships in terms of their management cannot be perceived as a one-way street. Further, in the management of a strategic partnerships, what counts is as to the substantiveness of strategic gains that accrue to both partners.

The US-India Strategic Partnership when analysed in light of the above indicates that under the present Indian political leadership this Strategic Partnership has evolved into a one way street, where India has acquiesced to facilitate US strategic interests in South Asia centered on Pakistan without any strategic quid-pro-quos from the United States in return.

It is strategically naive for the Indian political leadership to argue that India has gained economically, scientifically or technologically from this Strategic Partnership. Even if it was so, any gains in these spheres cannot offset the lack of strategic gains by India, in the strategic sphere, all too important for India’s national security interests.

India’s political leadership’s lack of strategic culture and strategic vision continue to stymie India’s exploitation of the strategic leverages that are available to it. Because of these limitations, India instead of being an assertive global power in the making stands eclipsed and stands reduced to being a “strategic co-equal of Pakistan" in the US strategic calculus.

India at large fervently hopes that India’s political leadership finds the “appropriate strategic voice” to spell out its strategic quid-pro-quos at the forthcoming Washington Strategic Dialogue and in the run-up to President Obama’s visit to India in November.

Concluding Observations

The US-India Strategic Partnership, if had substantively evolved, should have emerged as a game-changer in international politics and the global strategic calculus. Midway in its evolution the United States strategic priorities on China and Pakistan has seemingly left the US-India Strategic Partnership to be perceived in India as a US hedging strategy.

India’s political leadership also shares a major blame in that it failed to apply pro-active mid-course corrections when it became apparent that Pakistan and China counted more than India in the United States strategic calculus.

The United States renewed emphasis on the US-India Strategic Partnership for whatever strategic compulsions should remind the Indian political leadership that India still counts and that they must at least now find their “strategic voice” to ensure that strategic gains in their purist form accrue to India from a re-vitalized US-India Strategic Partnership.